

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 AEC-05 CIAE-00 H-01 INR-05 IO-10

L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03 PRS-01 SAJ-01

SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00 RSC-01 NSC-05 /085 W

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FM USMISSION NATO

TO SECSTATE WASHDC 9096

SECDEF WASHDC

INFO USDEL MBFR VIENNA

AMEMBASSY BONN

AMEMBASSY LONDON

USNMR SHAPE

USCINCEUR

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 USNATO 6674

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR: AD HOC GROUP BRIEFING OF THE NAC NOVEMBER 29

REF: A) USNATO 6605; B) USNATO 6633; C) MBFR VIENNA 454

1. SUMMARY OF THIS MESSAGE TRANSMITTED SEPTTEL.

2. AD HOC GROUP REPS ON NOVEMBER 29 BRIEFED THE NAC ON DEVELOPMENTS IN THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS. AMB RESOR(US) WAS PRINCIPAL AHG SPOKESMAN, ACCOMPANIED BY AMBASSADOR BEHREND(SFR) AND AMBASSADOR TUREL (TURKEY).

3. AMBASSADOR RESOR BEGAN THE BRIEFING BY DRAWING ON PARAS 2 TO 9, PARA 17 OF AHG REPORT TO THE NAC (REF C). AMBASSADOR RESOR SAID THE AHG

CONSIDERS IT VIRTUALLY CERTAIN THAT THE EAST WILL LEAK OR DESCRIBE ITS

"FREEZE" PROPOSAL NO LATER THAN THE END OF THIS NEGOTIATING SESSION ON DECEMBER 12. IT IS IMPORTANT THAT THE ALLIES HAVE AN AGREED POSITION

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FOR THE PUBLIC BY THN. IF THE ALLIES WANT TO MAKE A COUNTER-PROPOSAL, THE AHG WILL NEED TO HAVE IT BY THE END OF NEXT WEEK, SO THAT THE ALLIES COULD INTRODUCE IT IN VIENNA AT THE LAST INFORMAL ON DECEMBER 10.

4. DE STAERCKE (BELGIUM) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES CONSIDERED IT DIFFICULT TO REJECT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL OUT OF HAND. HIS AUTHORITIES SEE THE DANGERS IN THE PROPOSAL. IN ITS PRESENT FORM, THE PROPOSAL CONTAINS NO GUARANTEE ON THE CHARACTER OF THE NEGOTIATION. IT CALLS FOR NATIONAL SUB-CEILINGS. EVEN THOUGH THE SOVIETS SAY IT WOULD NOT SERVE AS A PRECEDENT, THERE IS THE DANGER THAT IT WOULD. BELGIUM WANTS TO ASK CLARIFICATION ABOUT THE PROPOSAL AND ABOUT THE OUTCOME OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. THE ALLIES SHOULD SEEK TO GIVE THIS PROPOSAL THE COLORATION WE WANT. BELGIUM THOUGHT THE FRG PROPOSAL TO MENTION A COUNTER-PROPOSAL IN THE NAC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE WOULD VIOLATE THE COMMITMENT WITH THE EAST CONCERNING PUBLICITY. DE STAERCKE ALSO INQUIRED WHAT FURTHER ELEMENTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ALLIED POSITION DID THE AHG HAVE IN MIND BY PARA 7(B) OF THE AHG REPORT TO THE NAC (REF C). THE TWO ELEMENTS WHICH CAME TO HIS MIND WERE PHASING, AND OPTION III.

5. RESOR SAID, WITH RESPECT TO PARA 7 OF THE AGH REPORT, THAT THE AGH ASSUMED THAT CAPITALS WOULD USE THE RECESS TO REACH CONCLUSIONS CONCERNING THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITION. NO ONE ON THE AHG HAD INSTRUCTIONS AT THIS POINT. TWO POSSIBILITIES FOR NEW ELEMENTS IN THE ALLIED POSITION ARE, OF COURSE, OPTION III, AND REDUCTIONS IN ALLIED AIR MANPOWER.

6. HARTOGH (NETHERLANDS) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES SAW THE SAME DISADVANTAGES TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL AS THE OTHER ALLIES. TWO ADVANTAGES WERE THE POSSIBILITY OF INDUCING THE EAST TO PROVIDE DATA, AND TO ACCEPT THAT THE NEGOTIATION CONCERN MANPOWER AND NOT ARMAMENTS. HOWEVER, ANOTHER ELEMENT IS THE DIFFICULTY IN EXPLAINING REJECTION OF THE PROPOSAL TO PUBLIC OPINION. HIS INSTRUCTIONS CALL FOR NATO TO STUDY WHETHER A FREEZE AT PRESENT LEVELS WOULD BE ADVANTAGEOUS TO EAST OR WEST. RE PARA 7 IN AHG REPORT TO THE NAC, NETHERLANDS FOUND PARA 7 A (MAINTAINING PRESENT ALLIED POSITION) NOT APPROPRIATE. HIS AUTHORITIES FAVORED APPROACH IN PARA 7 B (ADDING NEW ELEMENTS
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TO THE ALLIED POSITION). THE NETHERLANDS SUPPORTED THE RECOMMENDATION IN AMBASSADOR DE STAERCKES RECENT NOTE TO MEMEBERS OF THE NAC THAT THE ALLIES BEGIN TO STUDY THE NUCLEAR OPTION. THE NETHERLANDS HOPES THAT THE DELEGATION MOST INTERESTED (I.E. THE US) CAN PROPOSE ITS IDEAS SOON.

7. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ARE ALSO CONVINCED THAT THE ALLIES CANNOT JUST REJECT THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. THEY MUST COUNTER WITH THEIR OWN INITIATIVE, AND THEY MUST CONSIDER WHAT TO DO IF THE EAST PUBLICIZES ITS PROPOSAL. ITALY THOUGHT THE ALLIES SHOULD REJECT THE EASTERN PROPOSAL FOR THE REASONS GIVEN IN THE AHG REPORT, BUT BY PROPOSING SOMETHING IN ITS PLACE E.G. THE NON-INCREASE COMMITMENT ON AIR MANPOWER. RE PUBLIC OPINION, THE ALLIES SHOULD WORK ON SHOWING THAT THE SOVIET PROPOSAL IS PROPAGANDA, AND DOES NOT CONTRIBUTE TO THE NEGOTIATION. ITALY

DID NOT WANT REFERENCE TO THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL IN THE NAC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE, SINCE SUCH AN OFFICIAL REFERENCE WOULD VIOLATE THE ALLIED COMMITMENT REGARDING PUBLICITY.

8. KRAPF (FRG) REITERATED FRG VIEWS ON THE UNACCEPTABILITY OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. HE REMINDED THE NAC OF THE FRG IDEA OF A COUNTER PROPOSAL. . HE THOUGHT THAT IF THE OTHER SIDE DID NOT REPLY, E.G. ON DATA EXCHANGE, THAT WOULD FINISH THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

9. .PECK (UK) DOUBTED THAT THE ALLIES COULD DO A THOROUGH JOB ON A COUNTER-PROPOSAL BY DECEMBER 12, AND HE THOUGHT THAT THE AHG COULD PARRY THE EAST ON DECEMBER 10 AND 12. HE THOUGHT THAT THE ALLIES COULD PRESS THE EAST ON THEIR SENSITIVE POINT, I.E. DATA, WHICH THEIR MILITARY WILL NOT ALLOW THEM TO RELEASE. HE AGREED WITH CATALANO THAT NAC MINISTERIAL COMMUNIQUE SHOULD NOT MENTION THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. HE AGREED WITH HARTOGH THAT OPTION III HAS NOT REALLY BEEN DISCUSSED IN SPC OR THE NAC, AND THE ALLIES SHOULD TURN THEIR MINDS TO THIS SOON.

10. SVART (DENMARK) SAID HIS AUTHORITIES ALS FIIND THE EASTERN PROPOSAL UNACCEPTABLE IN ITS PRESENT FORM, AND THE ALLIES MUST FIND SOME WAY TO HANDLE IT. THE SPC SHOULD STUDY THIS QUESTHION IN DEPTH. THE VIEWS OF THE DIRECT PARTICIPANTS WILL WEIGH HEAVILY WITH THE DANISH AUTHORITIES.

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11. MENZIES (CANADA) SAID THAT IF THERE IS NO COUNTER-PROPOSAL, AND IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO PUT TOGETHER A SATISFACTORY ONE IN A SHORT TIME THE ALLIES WILL HAVE TO PRODUCE ARGUMENTS FOR POSSIBLE USE IN PUBLIC. THE ALLIES NEED SOME SIMPLE ARGUMENTS, E.G.

THAT THE ALLIES COULD ACCEPT A CEILING NOT GREATER THAN THE HIGHER OF THE TWO FORCE LEVELS, I.E. NO HIGHER THAN THE PACT FORCE LEVEL. HE SAW NO NEED TO BE UPSET ABOUT THE PROPAGANDA VALUE OF THE EASTERN PROPOSAL. HE ASKED WHAT WENT INTO THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7 A OF THE AHG REPORT. HE ALSO ASKED FOR RESOR'S ASSESSMENT OF THE EFFECT ON MBFR OF THE VLADIVOSTOK DISCUSSION OF SALT, WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO FBS, WHICH WAS "MENTIONED ENIGMATICALLY" AT THE PRESS CONFERENCE.

12. RESOR REPLIED, REGARDING THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7 A OF THE AHG REPORT, THAT SOME FEEL THAT THE SOVIETS WILL NOT MOVE UNTIL THEY HAVE A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME IN CSCE. IF ONE FELT THAT WAS THE DECISIVE FACTOR, THEN ONE WOULD WANT TO FOLLOW PARA 7 A AND MAINTAIN THE ALLIED POSITION SUBSTANTIALLY AS IT IS. HE SAID REFERENCE TO SALT IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7 A ONLY MEANT THAT VLADIVOSTOK MIGHT BE A TEST OF SOVIET INTENTIONS, IF
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THE SOVIETS WERE TRYING TO GET A GREATER MILITARY COMPLEMENT TO THEIR DETENTE POLICY. IN ANY EVENT, THE REFERENCE TO SALT WAS DRAFTED BEFORE VLADIVOSTOK. RE FBS, RESOR SAID HE HAD ONLY SEEN THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S PRESS CONFERENCE. AMBASSADOR BEHRENDT SAID THIS WAS A FAIR SUMMARY OF WHAT THE AHG INTENDED IN THE LAST SENTENCE OF PARA 7A.

13. MENZIES SAID THAT OUR GOVERNMENTS WOULD NEED TO MAKE A JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE DESIRABILITY OF ADDING NEW ELEMENTS TO THE ALLIED NEGOTIATING POSITIONS PER PARA 7B, IF THE SOVIETS DO, IN FACT, INTEND NO PROGRESS IN MBFR UNTIL THERE IS A BREAKTHROUGH IN CSCE.

14. DE STAERCKE ASKED, IF FBS IS NOW SEPARATE FROM SALT, DO WE NOT RISK ITS INCLUSION IN MBFR? HE THOUGHT OPTION III DESERVED SERIOUS ALLIED STUDY. HE LIKED MENZIES' IDEA OF A FREEZE AT THE HIGHER OF THE TWO FORCE LEVELS, AND THOUGHT THIS WAS THE BEGINNING OF A REPLY TO THE EASTERN PROPOSAL.

15. RESOR THOUGHT THE ALLIES NEEDED A CLEAR POSITION FOR PUBLIC USE BY DECEMBER 12, IN VIEW OF THE LIKELIHOOD THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD GO PUBLIC BY THEN. THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT BE IN A POSITION OF STUDYING THE EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL DURING THE RECESS, SINCE THIS WOULD GIVE THE EASTERN PROPOSAL STATUS. HE HOPED THAT THE NAC WOULD GIVE THE AHG ONLY THE OUTLINE OF A POSITION, LEAVING THE WORDING OF ANY PRESS STATEMENTS TO THE AHG.

16. PANSA (ACTING SYG) THEN SUMMED UP THE DISCUSSION CONCERNING NEXT ALLIED STEPS REGARDING EASTERN FREEZE PROPOSAL. SEVERAL NAC MEMBERS COMMENTED ON THIS SUMMING UP, WITH RESOR STRESSING THE NEED NOT TO SEND A CONFUSED SIGNAL TO THE EAST REGARDING THE FREEZE PROPOSAL, AND THE CONSEQUENT NEED NOT TO REMAIN SILENT ON IT IN THE NEGOTIATIONS AT VIENNA. THE CONSENSUS OF THE NAC WAS THAT THE SPC SHOULD BEGIN MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, ON A PRIORITY BASIS TO CONSIDER THE ALLIED REACTION TO THE EASTERN

PROPOSAL, WITH A VIEW TOWARD NAC GUIDANCE TO THE AHG BY THE END OF THE WEEK. THIS CONSIDERATION OF THE ALLIED REACTIN SHOULD INCLUDE WHETHER A COUNTER-PROPOSAL IS DESIRABLE, AND IF SO, WHAT SHOULD BE ITS ELEMENTS. IF THE EAST RAISES ITS PROPOSAL AGAIN IN THE NEGOTIATION, THE AHG SHOULD, FOR THE TIME BEING, SIMPLY REFER TO THE PRELIMINARY REACTION IT HAS ALREADY GIVEN THE EAST. THE NAC APPEARED TO LEAVE TO THE AHG THE QUESTION OF PRESS GUIDANCE
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IN THE EVENT THE EAST GOES PUBLIC. AT A BRIEF, LATE AFTERNOON MEETING, SPC MEMBERS CONFIRMED THAT TIS WAS THE INTENTION OF THEIR AMBASSADORS AT THE NAC.MCAULIFFE

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